Item 7.F.1. Interlocal Agreement btw Washoe and SOS—VREMS and Knowink
Comment: The SOS wants Washoe to pay for Knowink Poll Pads that he refuses to classify as critical infrastructure and thus ignore proper inspection and approval by his office. The VREMS system comes with strings attached as Washoe has had to upgrade its equipment to accommodate the VREMS and automated signature verification—which voters/taxpayers have not been asked to approve and have not approved.
Of critical importance: 1) Knowink Poll Pads (Liberty Vote 1.0) have known cybersecurity vulnerabilities, shares voter data on the cloud with third parties, use of inferior stylus with fat rubber tip (my finger works better), and are not tested and approved by the SOS, approval by the EAC pending; 2) Automated Signature Verification communicates with the VREMS and is always connected to the Internet, raising cybersecurity concerns, and has not been proven to be accurate. (Still waiting for Pre-LAT testing results from the Washoe ROV.)
Recommendation: A) Do not approve/renew the Interlocal Agreement as written. Wait for the EAC to approve Liberty Vote Polls Pads and other voting equipment, formerly under the Dominion dba; B) Require the SOS to classify ‘voter verification’ systems as critical infrastructure, and to properly test and approve of such systems using a neutral third-party firm; C) As a contingency, prepare paper voter rolls to be used at the polls.
Item 7.F.1. Interlocal Agreement btw Washoe and SOS—VREMS and Knowink
Comment: The SOS wants Washoe to pay for Knowink Poll Pads that he refuses to classify as critical infrastructure and thus ignore proper inspection and approval by his office. The VREMS system comes with strings attached as Washoe has had to upgrade its equipment to accommodate the VREMS and automated signature verification—which voters/taxpayers have not been asked to approve and have not approved.
Of critical importance: 1) Knowink Poll Pads (Liberty Vote 1.0) have known cybersecurity vulnerabilities, shares voter data on the cloud with third parties, use of inferior stylus with fat rubber tip (my finger works better), and are not tested and approved by the SOS, approval by the EAC pending; 2) Automated Signature Verification communicates with the VREMS and is always connected to the Internet, raising cybersecurity concerns, and has not been proven to be accurate. (Still waiting for Pre-LAT testing results from the Washoe ROV.)
Recommendation: A) Do not approve/renew the Interlocal Agreement as written. Wait for the EAC to approve Liberty Vote Polls Pads and other voting equipment, formerly under the Dominion dba; B) Require the SOS to classify ‘voter verification’ systems as critical infrastructure, and to properly test and approve of such systems using a neutral third-party firm; C) As a contingency, prepare paper voter rolls to be used at the polls.